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Recent experimental studies show that emotions can have a significant effect on
the way we think, decide, and solve problems. This paper presents a series of four
experiments on how emotions affect logical reasoning. In two experiments different
groups of participants first had to pass a manipulated intelligence test. Their emotional
state was altered by giving them feedback, that they performed excellent, poor or on
average. Then they completed a set of logical inference problems (with if p, then q
statements) either in a Wason selection task paradigm or problems from the logical
propositional calculus. Problem content also had either a positive, negative or neutral
emotional value. Results showed a clear effect of emotions on reasoning performance.
Participants in negative mood performed worse than participants in positive mood, but
both groups were outperformed by the neutral mood reasoners. Problem content also
had an effect on reasoning performance. In a second set of experiments, participants
with exam or spider phobia solved logical problems with contents that were related to
their anxiety disorder (spiders or exams). Spider phobic participants’ performance was
lowered by the spider-content, while exam anxious participants were not affected by
the exam-related problem content. Overall, unlike some previous studies, no evidence
was found that performance is improved when emotion and content are congruent.
These results have consequences for cognitive reasoning research and also for cognitively
oriented psychotherapy and the treatment of disorders like depression and anxiety.
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INTRODUCTION
In the field of experimental psychology, for a long time the pre-
dominant approach was a “divide and conquer” account in which
cognition and emotion have been studied in strict isolation (e.g.,
Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Wilson and Keil, 2001; Holyoak and
Morrison, 2005). Yet, in the last decade many researchers have
realized that this is a quite artificial distinction and have regarded
both systems as distinct but interacting (Dalgleish and Power,
1999; Martin and Clore, 2001). This new line of research resulted
in many interesting findings and showed that emotions can have
an influence on howwe think and how successful we are at solving
cognitive tasks (e.g., Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Bless et al., 1996;
Schwarz and Skurnik, 2003). Such findings are not only relevant
for basic cognitive research, such as reasoning (e.g., Blanchette,
2014), but may also have implications for cognitively oriented
psychotherapy and the treatment of disorders like depression and
anxiety.
In the present paper we explore the effect of emotion on a cog-
nitive task that is often considered to be a test of rational thinking
par excellence: logical reasoning. We start with a brief description
of the logical problems that were used in our study. Then we sum-
marize what is currently known about the connection between
logical reasoning and emotional states. In the main part of the
paper, we describe our hypotheses concerning the connection
between logical reasoning and emotional states and then report
a series of four experiments, two with a mood induction and two
with participants who have a fear of either exams or spiders. In the
final section we discuss the connection between logical reasoning
and emotions and draw some general conclusions.
LOGICAL REASONING PROBLEMS
Logical reasoning goes back to the antique Greek philosopher
Aristotle and is today considered to be essential for the success
of people in school and daily life and all kinds of scientific dis-
coveries (Johnson-Laird, 2006). In the psychological lab it is often
investigated by means of conditional reasoning tasks. Such tasks
are composed of a first premise, a second premise and a con-
clusion. The first premise consists of an “if p, then q” statement
that posits q to be true if p is true. The second premise refers to
the truth of the antecedent (“if” part) or the consequent (“then”
part). The participants‘ task is to decide whether the conclusion
follows logically from the two given premises. In this regard, two
inferences are valid and two are invalid (given they are interpreted
as implications and not as biconditionals, i.e., as “if and only if”).
The two valid inferences are modus ponens (MP; “if p, then q, and
p is true, then q is true”) andmodus tollens (MT; “if p, then q, and
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q is false, then p is false”), whereas the two invalid inferences are
affirmation of consequent (AC; “if p, then q, and q is true, then
p is true”) and denial of antecedent (DA; “if p, then q, and p is
false, then q is false”). This type of reasoning task was used for
Experiments 2–4 while a Wason selection task (Wason, 1966) was
used for Experiment 1. The classical Wason selection task (WST)
consists of a conditional rule (e.g., “If a card has a vowel on one
side, then it has an even number on the other side.”) accompanied
by four cards marked with a letter or number, visible only from
one side (e.g., A, D, 2, 3). Thus, one side of the card presents the
truth or falsity of the antecedent (e.g., A, D) and the other side the
truth or falsity of the consequence (e.g., 2, 3). This task requires
turning over only those cards which are needed in order to check
the validity of the rule. The logically correct response is to turn
over the A-card (to check whether the other side is marked with
an even number, MP) and the 3-card (because this is not an even
number and therefore no vowel should be on the other side, MT).
For reasons of brevity, the reader is referred to Johnson-Laird
(2006) and Knauff (2007) for a detailed overview of the different
types of reasoning problems used in the present paper. We used
these tasks in the present work since sentential conditional tasks
and the Wason selection task are the best understood problems of
logical reasoning research (overview in Johnson-Laird and Byrne,
2002).
PREVIOUS STUDIES AND MAIN HYPOTHESES
Several studies on logical reasoning found that participants’
performance is modulated by their emotional state. In several
experiments, participants underwent a mood induction or were
recruited based on their pre-existing emotional state. In both
conditions, the emotional state often resulted in a deterioration
of reasoning performance (Oaksford et al., 1996). In another
study participants were recruited because they reported being
depressed (Channon and Baker, 1994). They were presented with
categorical syllogisms and their performance was worse than that
of non-depressed participants. One possible explanation is that
emotionally congruent information (e.g., sad content in case of
being depressed) put additional load on working memory (e.g.,
Baddeley, 2003). Other explanations are that different emotional
states affect people’s motivation to solve rather complex cognitive
tasks (Melton, 1995) or that the emotional state affects how atten-
tion is allocated (e.g., Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2012) even with
positive material (e.g., Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2013).
The content of the reasoning task can also have an effect on
performance. For instance, the content can result in a stereotypi-
cal reaction which negatively affects performance on a conditional
reasoning task (Lefford, 1946; see also De Jong et al., 1998). Other
studies have shown that negative as well as positive content has
a detrimental effect on conditional reasoning performance as
opposed to neutral content which may be due to reduced working
memory resources (Blanchette and Richards, 2004; Blanchette,
2006). The problem content can also be freed from any semantic
value by using non-words that have been conditioned via classical
conditioning to assume an emotional value. Therefore, the effect
of non-semantic emotional material on reasoning performance
can be investigated. Classical conditioning has been used to con-
dition non-words and neutral words with a negative or positive
emotional value and resulted in participants providing fewer log-
ically valid answers in a conditional reasoning task (Blanchette
and Richards, 2004; Blanchette, 2006). The hypothesis that emo-
tions affect how conditional reasoning tasks are interpreted could
not be confirmed (Blanchette, 2006).
The literature review shows that mood and emotional problem
content negatively affect logical reasoning performance. However,
the effects on reasoning performance are still ambiguous, in
particular when mood is combined with a problem content
that is relevant to the mood, e.g., a participant in a sad mood
is presented with a sad reasoning problem about bereavement
(mood and content are congruent). Some studies have shown
that such a combination results in worse performance. Health-
anxiety patients, when reasoning about health-threats in a Wason
selection task, have a threat-confirming strategy (Smeets et al.,
2000), for example, they very likely interpret a tremor as a sign
of Parkinson’s disease or chest pain as an indicator for cardiac
infarction, etc., even though other—less dangerous—causes are
much more likely. Thus, threat-confirming participants select the
card that confirms (rather than falsifies) their fears about the
anticipated illness. Controls that do not have health-anxiety do
not show such a bias when reasoning about health-threats. These
findings are similar to another study that also used a Wason
selection task where spider-phobic participants confirmed dan-
ger rules and falsified safety rules more often for phobia-relevant
information than controls (De Jong et al., 1997a). Furthermore,
socially anxious participants performed worse in relational infer-
ence tasks when the content was relevant to social anxiety as
opposed to neutral content (Vroling and de Jong, 2009). However,
spider phobic patients compared to non-phobic controls per-
formed worse when the reasoning problem’s content was specifi-
cally related to their phobia as well as when it contained general
threat material (De Jong et al., 1997b).
Other studies found no difference between control partici-
pants in a neutral mood, participants with health-anxiety (De
Jong et al., 1998) or participants who were not recruited from
a clinical population but nevertheless reported anxiety symp-
toms (Vroling and de Jong, 2010). Participants in a neutral mood
as well as anxious participants performed worse in the threat
condition. Lastly, some studies even found a beneficial effect of
emotions on logical reasoning performance. After the bombing
in London in 2005 a study was carried out to investigate if the
increased amount of fear which was related to the bombing,
has an impact on the performance of participants when solving
conditional reasoning tasks that were related in content to the
bombing (Blanchette et al., 2007). It resulted that fearful partic-
ipants provided more correct responses on a reasoning task with
fear-related content than participants that did not report a high
level of fear. In another study participants that had been primed
to be angry or who remembered an incident when they have been
cheated on, performed better when the reasoning task involved
detecting cheaters (Chang and Wilson, 2004). This mood con-
gruent effect was not found when participants who remembered
an altruistic incident had to detect altruists. An evolutionary psy-
chology explanation is offered for these findings as the authors
suggest that the ability to detect cheaters provides an evolutionary
advantage (Chang and Wilson, 2004).
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The ambiguous results in the literature motivated us to bring
together the effect of the reasoners’ emotional state and the effect
of the reasoning problems’ emotionally-laden content. Based
on this combination we formulated and tested the following
hypotheses:
(1) Positive and negative emotion1 will result in a reduction of
reasoning performance.
(2) Positive and negative problem content will result in a reduc-
tion of reasoning performance.
(3) There will be an interaction between the person’s emotional
state and the emotional content of the problem.
To test these hypotheses, four experiments have been carried out
to investigate the effect of emotion, problem content and the com-
bination of the two on reasoning performance. The experiments
are:
• Experiment 1: Positive, negative or neutral emotion (induced)
paired with a Wason selection task that had positive, negative
or neutral problem content.
• Experiment 2: Positive, negative or neutral emotion (induced)
paired with conditional reasoning tasks that had positive, neg-
ative or neutral problem content.
• Experiment 3: Anxious or neutral emotion (spider-phobic or
non-phobic participants) paired with conditional reasoning
tasks that had neutral, negative or anxious (phobia-relevant)
content.
• Experiment 4: Anxious or neutral emotion (exam anxiety or
confidence) paired with conditional reasoning tasks that had
neutral, negative or anxious (exam anxiety-relevant) content.
EXPERIMENT 1: EMOTIONS IN THE WASON SELECTION
TASK
This experiment was designed in order to test the hypotheses that
emotion and emotional content have a disrupting effect on rea-
soning performance. The participants’ emotion was either neutral
or induced to be positive or negative and then they had to solve
Wason selection tasks. The content of the reasoning tasks which
all participants had to solve was positive, negative or neutral as
well.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty students from the University of Giessen participated in this
study (mean age: 22.93 years; range: 19–30 years; 18 female, 12
male). They did not participate in any previous investigations
on conditional reasoning and they received a monetary com-
pensation of eight Euro. The participants came from a range of
disciplines and none of them were psychology students. They
were all native German speakers and provided informed written
consent.
1For reasons of simplicity the term “emotion” is also used to represent “mood”
(emotional state). The distinction between emotion and mood will only be
pointed out were necessary.
Design and materials
First, the emotional state of the participants was measured with
the German version of the positive and negative affect schedule
(PANAS; Watson et al., 1988; Krohne et al., 1996) with which
a score for negative and one for positive affect can be com-
puted. Then the participants’ emotional state was altered by a
manipulated IQ-test. The procedure is described below. However,
participants were not told that their emotional state was to be
altered with a success-failure-method and they were randomly
assigned to the “success group,” “neutral group,” and “failure
group.” This method has high reliability and ecological validity
(Nummenmaa and Niemi, 2004).
During the logical reasoning task participants had to solve 24
Wason selection tasks based on the three types of content (pos-
itive, negative, and neutral). While Wason selection tasks with
positive emotional value described success situations, the nega-
tive ones described failure situations. This was done to create a
link between emotion and the content of the reasoning material.
Table 1 shows examples of the positive, negative, and neutral logi-
cal reasoning problems. The sentences were presented in German
language. Each problem was presented by means of four differ-
ent virtual cards on a computer screen as can be seen in Figure 1.
The participants were told that each card contained one part of
the rule on one side and the other part of the rule on the other
side. On one set of cards, for example, one side of the card con-
tained the information about whether somebody succeeds or not
and on the other side whether somebody is glad or not (the cor-
rect answer in our example is card 1 and card 4 which means
to verify and to falsify the rule; card 1 and card 3 which is the
empirically most frequent answer means that participants in both
cases try to verify the rule). The order of cards on the screen was
pseudo-randomized and the order of Wason selection problems
was completely randomized across participants.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room
at the Department of Psychology of the University of Giessen.
Prior to the experiment they were informed about the proce-
dure. The emotional state of the participants was measured with
the German version of the positive and negative affect schedule
(PANAS; Watson et al., 1988; Krohne et al., 1996) with which
a score for negative and for positive affect can be computed.
Table 1 | Examples for negative (mirroring failure situations), positive
(mirroring success situations) and neutral rules (words and sentences
were presented in German language in all experiments).
Type of content Example of statement
Positive When somebody passes an exam, then he is happy
When somebody triumphed, then he is lucky
Negative When somebody feels overstrained, then he is sad
When somebody has self-doubts, then he is
depressed
Neutral When somebody is cabinet maker, then he works with
wood
When somebody showers, then he uses shampoo
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FIGURE 1 | Example of a WST problem with the four corresponding
cards.
This scale is based on 10 positive and 10 negative adjectives.
Participants are required to state the emotional intensity of each
word on a five point scale: 1 = “not at all,” 2 = “a little,” 3 =
“moderately,” 4 = “quite a bit,” and 5 = “very much.” Thus,
for the positive as well as for the negative affect a score ranging
between 10 and 50 points could be computed. Examples of the
test adjectives are: afraid, guilty, inspired, proud, etc. This emo-
tion measurement schedule has been validated in several studies
(e.g., Krohne et al., 1996; Crawford and Henry, 2004).
After that the participants carried out a subset of items from
the IST2000R (Amthauer et al., 2001), which is a popular IQ-
test in psychological research and practice. This subtest consisted
of 13 items from three different categories: sentence comple-
tion, calculation and matrix tasks. These items were selected from
all items by using the norming data from the intelligence test.
For one group we selected the 13 problems that are most dif-
ficult, for the second group we selected items with moderate
difficulty according to the norms and for the third group we
used the easiest items from the IST2000R. Here is one exam-
ple for the calculation tasks: (24/144) × 96 = ? (difficult), (3/6)
+ (20/8) = ? (moderate), and 8 × 123 = ? (easy). The items
were presented on a sheet of paper and had to be solved by
the participants in a limited time. In order to boost the effect
of the emotion manipulation we also told them that the test
was especially developed to predict academic success and that
an average student solves approximately 50% of the items cor-
rectly. The time limit was 15min. After finishing the test the
participants received a manipulated verbal feedback on their per-
formance to influence their emotional state. The feedback for
the negative emotion group with the difficult problems was:
“We are sorry to say that the analysis of your data showed
that your performance was below the average student perfor-
mance.” The feedback for the neutral emotion group with mod-
erate item difficulty was: “The analysis of your data showed
that your performance was on average student performance.”
The participants from the positive emotion group with the easy
items were told that their performance was above the aver-
age of student performance. Please note that this feedback did
not reflect their real performance, because even if participants
managed to solve the difficult problems they got the negative
feedback. Accordingly, the participants in the positive emotional
group got positive feedback even if they failed to solve the
problems.
After this the emotional state was assessed again to see whether
the mood induction was successful. Finally they were given the
Wason selection tasks. In order to hide the real purpose of our
study, we told the participants they had to do the PANAS since
current emotions could influence their performance on intelli-
gence tests and that we wanted to control for this. All our exper-
iments were approved by the ethics committee of the German
Psychological Association (DGPs).
The experiment then started with the emotion induction
sequence [PANAS (t1), intelligence test items, feedback and
PANAS(t2)], followed by the 24 Wason selection tasks. A com-
puter administered the Wason selection problems using the
SuperLab 4.0 software (Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA) and
recorded participants‘ answers (in all experiments). A self-paced
design was used for data collection. When the problem with
the four cards was presented on the screen participants had to
decide which of the cards they would like to turn over in order
to check the validity of the given rule. They were asked to pick
one or more cards by pressing the corresponding keys on the
labeled keyboard. For instance, to turn over card 1 they had to
press the “1” key, which was clearly labeled “card 1.” The prob-
lems were separated by the instruction to press the <spacebar>
whenever ready for the next problem. At the beginning one prac-
tice problem was presented to familiarize participants with the
task but no feedback was given. At the end of the experiment
all participants were informed about the true nature, the inten-
tion and the manipulations of the experiment. In all experiments
data was analyzed with SPSS19 (IBM©) using analyses of vari-
ance (ANOVAs) and t-tests (details are given in each of the Results
sections).
RESULTS
The emotion manipulation was successful, as can be seen in
Figure 2. The success group revealed a significant increase of
positive affect from t1 to t2 [t(9) = −4.906, p = 0.001], while
the negative affect decreased. The failure group scores showed
a significant decrease in positive affect [t(9) = 5.471, p < 0.001]
and a significant increase in negative affect [t(9) = −4.226, p >
0.01]. For the neutral group no differences were found, nei-
ther for the positive nor the negative affect. A One-Way ANOVA
including the factor “positive difference scores” and a between-
subject factor (neutral, success, or failure group) revealed sig-
nificant group differences [F(2, 27) = 23.964, Mean Squared Error
(MSE) = 6.511, p < 0.001]. A second One-Way ANOVAwith the
factor “negative difference scores” also showed group differences
[F(2, 27) = 7.975, MSE = 6.407, p < 0.01]. Planned t-tests for
independent samples revealed significant differences in positive
difference scores for the success and neutral group [t(18) = 4.618,
p < 0.001] and for the success and failure group [t(18) = 7.069,
p < 0.001]. Significant differences in the negative scores were
observed for the comparison between success group and failure
group [t(18) = −3.192, p < 0.01], as well as for the compar-
ison between failure group and neutral group [t(18) = 4.024,
p = 0.001].
On average, participants only solved 5% of the problems
correctly (turning card 1 and card 4; every other decision was
incorrect which occurred in 95% of the cases). We are aware that
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FIGURE 2 | Difference scores (t2 - t1) for the emotion induction of
Experiment 1 for each group. ∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
this performance is very low. Therefore, we initially thought that
it might be useful to statistically test whether this performance
significantly differs from chance level. We then decided, however,
not to follow this idea, because our results agree with the entire
literature on theWason selection task (Wason and Johnson-Laird,
1972; overview in Manktelow, 2004). Moreover, the usual way
of dealing with these low performance rates is to use the “falsi-
fication index” and the “confirmation index,” which have been
introduced by Oaksford et al. (1996). These indices give a better
performance measurement than just comparing correct answers
in theWason selection tasks. The indices can range from+2 to−2
and provide a measure of whether an individual tried to verify or
to falsify a given rule by turning over certain cards or card com-
binations (Oaksford et al., 1996; Chang and Wilson, 2004). The
falsification index (FI) is computed with the formula FI = (p +
not q) − (not p + q) and stands for the participants’ tendency
to choose the p and not q cards in order to falsify the rule. Note,
that a score of +2 is equivalent to full logicality. The confirmation
index (CI) is the “complement” of the falsification index; it stands
for the degree to which participants choose the p and q cards in
order to confirm the rule. It is calculated with the formula CI= (p
+ q) − (not p + not q) (Oaksford et al., 1996). Note that a score
of +2 is equivalent to a confirming strategy without falsifying the
given rule. The mean falsification index is shown in Figure 3.
Falsification indices were then used in an ANOVA including
the within-subject factor content (positive, negative, neutral) and
the between-subject factor group (success, failure, neutral). This
analysis showed that emotion of participants resulted in a signifi-
cant difference, F(2, 27) = 6.033, MSE = 0.574, p < 0.01, but not
the content of the reasoning problem. Post-hoc t-tests showed that
the falsification index of the failure group differed significantly
from those of the neutral group [t(3.737) = −3.435, p < 0.01] and
the success group [t(10.353) = 3.14, p = 0.01]. Overall, the neutral
group [Mean Falisification Index (MFI) = 0.636, Standard Error
(SE) = 0.19] performed better than the success group (MFI =
0.426, SE = 0.14) and the success group in turn was better than
the failure group (MFI = −0.029, SE = 0.038). A more detailed
descriptive analysis showed that this effect is due to a specific type
of error. In fact, participants in the failure group have chosen the
p and q card most frequently (Figure 4).
FIGURE 3 | Falsification index (ranging from −2 to 2) for the WSTs for
each group. It represents the choices of p and not-q in order to falsify the
rule (modus tollens). ∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
FIGURE 4 | Choices of the p and q cards of the WSTs in relative
frequencies (%) for each group. With p and q (modus ponens)
participants tried to confirm the rule.
DISCUSSION
The results indicate that the emotions of an individual have an
effect on reasoning performance independent from task content.
In particular, a negative emotion resulted in a lower falsifica-
tion index meaning that participants in a negative emotional state
were more likely to deviate from logical norms. The participants
in a positive state were also not as good as the neutral group,
but this difference was less pronounced. Overall, participants in a
neutral emotional state performed best. However, no interaction
has been found between participants’ emotion and the emotional
task content, neither for the falsification index, nor for the con-
firmation index. Thus, it was not easier for individuals in positive
(negative) emotion to solve Wason selection tasks with positive
(negative) content. The reason for this might be that the Wason
selection task overall is too difficult to solve and that there is no
generally accepted theory about what makes the tasks so com-
plex. A recent overview of such approaches can be found in Klauer
et al. (2007). For our studies the reasons for the difficulty of the
Wason selection task are not particularly essential. However, a
detrimental result might be that participants’ low performance
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could result in a “floor effect” and thus existing effects of the emo-
tional content might not be visible in the data. In order to control
for this possible deficit, a paradigm for the subsequent experiment
has been chosen which is known to result in better performance.
EXPERIMENT 2: EMOTIONS AND CONDITIONAL REASONING
TASKS
The intention of this experiment was to use a reasoning task
which participants find easier to solve than a Wason selection
task. We therefore used a conditional reasoning paradigm. If
such a task is easier, any difference between groups’ performance
should be much clearer and such differences can be more readily
attributed to the experimental manipulation. Again, the condi-
tional reasoning tasks had a positive, negative or neutral content
and like in the previous experiment, participants’ emotions were
either induced (positive or negative) or neutral.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty students from the University of Giessen participated in
this study (mean age: 22.6 years; range: 20–27 years; 22 female, 8
male). They did not participate in any of the other investigations.
They received an eight Euro compensation for participation. All
participants were naïve with respect to the aim of the study, none
were psychology students. All were native German speakers and
provided informed written consent.
Design and materials
The same success-failure-method which was used in the previ-
ous experiment was used for the emotion induction. Reasoning
problems consisted of pairs of premises that were followed by a to-
be-validated conclusion. Four premise-pairs had a positive, four
a neutral and four a negative content. These 12 problems were
combined with the four possible inferences: modus ponens (MP),
modus tollens (MT), denial of antecedent (DA) and affirma-
tion of consequence (AC), resulting in 48 conditional inferences
per participant. All problems were randomized for each partici-
pant. Half of the presented conclusions were valid; the other half
were invalid. Here are two examples of inferences with a valid
conclusion:
Modus ponens/positive emotional content
Premise 1: When a person succeeds, then the person is glad.
Premise 2: A person succeeds.
Conclusion: This person is glad.
Modus tollens/negative emotional content
Premise 1: When a person performs poorly, then this person is
angry.
Premise 2: A person is not angry.
Conclusion: This person did not perform poorly.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory
room at the Department of Psychology of the University of
Giessen. Prior to the experiment, the participants were again
instructed about the procedure of the experiment. Subsequently,
the emotion induction started and resulted in a “success group,”
a “failure group,” and a “neutral group.” Then the inferences
were presented on a computer screen. A self-paced design was
used. After reading the first premise on the screen, participants
had to press the space bar to reach the next premise, then again
the space bar to reach the conclusion. While both premises were
presented in black letters the conclusion was presented in red.
The task required an evaluation whether the conclusion followed
necessarily from the premises (no evaluations as biconditionals).
Participants responded by pressing either a “Yes” key or a “No”
key on the keyboard. There were two practice trials at the begin-
ning of the experiment but no feedback was given. At the end of
the experiment there was a debriefing and a detailed explanation
of the true purpose of the experiment.
RESULTS
The emotion induction was again successful. In the success group
the positive affect was elevated and the negative affect reduced
(similar to the previous experiments’ mood induction). In the
failure group the positive affect decreased and the negative affect
increased (although the latter was not significant, due to a large
standard error). No alteration for positive and negative affect
was found in the neutral group. The ANOVA revealed significant
group differences [F(2, 27) = 15.964, MSE = 13.607, p < 0.001]
and the t-tests for independent samples showed that the suc-
cess and neutral group were dissimilar in the difference scores
of positive affect [t(18) = 2.146, p < 0.05], as well as the success
and failure group [t(18) = 5.666, p < 0.001] and the failure and
neutral group [t(18) = −3.854, p < 0.01].
Performance for the sentential conditional inference problems
was better than for the Wason selection tasks as 61.46% of the
problems were correctly solved. Error rates were compared using
an ANOVA for the emotionality of the participants (success, fail-
ure, and neutral group) and the emotional content (positive, neg-
ative, neutral). Significant differences were found for both factors.
With respect to the emotional state the performance of
the participants in the three groups was reliably different
[F(2, 27) = 3.68, MSE = 2.492, p < 0.05] and paired sample t-
tests show that error rates for the failure group were signifi-
cantly higher compared to the neutral group [t(18) = 2.622, p <
0.05]. The neutral group showed best performance [Mean (M) =
0.310, SE = 0.046] followed by the success group (M = 0.402,
SE = 0.035) and the failure group which committed most
errors (M = 0.446, SE = 0.024). These results are represented in
Figure 5.
The difference between positive and negative content of the
reasoning problems was also significant. The ANOVA showed a
significant main effect [F(2, 54) = 3.159,MSE = 0.555, p = 0.05]
and the post-hoc paired sample t-tests revealed a significant dif-
ference in error rates between positive and negative content
[t(29) = 2.491, p < 0.05]. The fewest errors were made with
negative content (M = 0.356, SE = 0.029), followed by neutral
content (M = 0.385, SE = 0.022), and positive content (M =
0.417, SE = 0.028). This is visualized in Figure 6. However, no
interaction was found between emotional state and task content.
DISCUSSION
The reported findings show that several factors can influence rea-
soning performance. Performance can be affected either by the
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 570 | 6
Jung et al. Emotions and logical reasoning
FIGURE 5 | Error rates in relative frequencies (%) for the conditional
reasoning task for each group. ∗p ≤ 0.05.
FIGURE 6 | Error rates in relative frequencies (%) for the conditional
reasoning task for each type of content. ∗p ≤ 0.05.
emotion of the individual or the content of the problem or the
type of inference.
The effect of emotion might be due to the fact that emotion
results in representations in working memory that occupy the
same subsystems that are also needed for reasoning (Oaksford
et al., 1996). The content effect is also interesting since it chal-
lenges previous findings. While we found fewer errors in infer-
ences with negative content, Blanchette and Richards (2004)
found that emotions impair reasoning performance no matter
whether they are positive or negative.
EXPERIMENT 3: SPIDER-PHOBIC PARTICIPANTS AND
CONDITIONAL REASONING
In contrast to the previous experiments the sample for this
experiment was selected from a population with spider phobia.
Therefore, it was not necessary to induce emotions as participants
were selected for their anxiety with high ecological validity. This
was done to expand the findings of the previous experiments in
order to see if a difference in performance can be found for partic-
ipants that already have pre-existing moods in certain situations
without any mood induction. Additionally, we were interested in
whether content relevant to the illness of such participants has
any effect on their reasoning abilities.
METHODS
Participants
Nine spider phobic students (mean age: 22.33 years; range: 20–26
years; 7 female, 2 male) and seven non-phobic control students
(mean age: 22.86 years; range: 20–26 years; 7 female) from the
University of Giessen participated in the experiment. Participants
were selected from a larger sample by means of scores on the
Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Klorman et al., 1974). SPQ
scores of spider fearful students (M = 20.22; SE = 0.878) were
significantly higher than those of the non-fearful control students
(M = 2.00; SE = 0.873) [t(14) = −14.459; p < 0.001]. Each par-
ticipant received five Euro or a course credit for participation.
Moreover, we controlled for participants being no psychology
students (thus, no pre-experience with logical reasoning tasks)
and all were native German speakers. All participants provided
informed written consent.
Design and materials
Design and procedure were similar to that of Experiment 2.
Forty-eight reasoning problems consisted of pairs of premises
that were followed by a to-be-validated conclusion. However, the
content differed because four statements had a spider phobia
relevant content, four were generally negative and four neutral.
The presentation of the 48 three-term problems was random-
ized across participants. Examples of the statements are presented
in Table 2.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room at the
Department of Psychology of the University of Giessen. At the
beginning participants filled out the SPQ. Afterwards the logical
reasoning tasks had to be solved. Presentation of problems and
recording of responses was identical to Experiment 2.
RESULTS
Error rates of the conditional reasoning task were compared using
an ANOVA with the between-subject factor group and the two
within-subject factors content and type of reasoning.
For the content of reasoning problems a significant main
effect was obtained [F(2, 28) = 4.645; p < 0.05]. Further paired
t-tests showed that error rates for spider phobia relevant
problems (M = 36.72%; SE = 4.30%) resulted in significantly
more errors than neutral ones (M = 30.47%; SE = 4.41%)
Table 2 | Examples of statements with different content.
Type of content Example of statement
Spider phobia relevant When a person sees a toy spider,
then the person is scared witless
Negative When a person is anorexic,
then the person has to be force-fed
Neutral When a person is a craftsman,
then the person has served an apprenticeship
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[t(15) = 2.928; p = 0.01]. This was due to spider phobics per-
forming worse on phobia relevant contents. This interaction
between problem content and emotion was significantly dif-
ferent [F(2, 28) = 6.807; p < 0.01]. A post-hoc paired t-test
revealed that spider phobics performed significantly worse
for inference problems with spider phobia relevant content
(M = 43.06%; SE = 4.47%) compared to negative ones (M =
34.72%; SE = 5.01%) [t(8) = 2.667; p < 0.05]. Furthermore,
phobia relevant problems resulted in more errors than neutral
ones (M = 36.81%; SE = 4.71%) but marginally failed to reach
significance [t(8) = 2.268; p = 0.053]. However, non-phobics
made significantly more errors for inferences with negative con-
tent (M = 33.93%; SE = 6.38%) compared to spider phobia rel-
evant (M = 28.57%; SE = 7.20%) [t(6) = −2.521; p < 0.05] and
neutral problems (M = 22.32%; SE = 7.33%) [t(6) = −3.653;
p < 0.05]. This interaction pattern between the groups and the
task content of the conditional reasoning task is visualized in
Figure 7.
DISCUSSION
Our results show that Spider phobics’ performance was worst on
problems related to spider phobia. We are aware of the fact that
our sample size is rather small. One reason was that it is difficult
to find spider phobics, because they usually avoid situations where
they are confronted with spiders. However, our control group was
also small. The reason for that is that we initially also tested nine
participants in the control group (same number as in the exper-
imental group) but then we had to eliminate two participants
(due to response strategy, incomplete data recording) and could
not replace them by two new participants for technical reasons.
However, we do not think that this is a serious problem, because
even with this small sample size our differences reached the level
of statistical significance. Given these thoughts we think that our
results reliably show that illness related tasks impair reasoning for
anxiety patients.
There are a couple of possible explanations of how (positive
and negative) emotions impeded on reasoning performance. One
explanation is that all kinds of emotions have negative effects on
FIGURE 7 | Error rates in relative frequencies (%) for the spider phobic
and non-phobic participants. ∗p ≤ 0.05.
the motivation or effort of the participants (e.g., Lefford, 1946).
Other explanations are based on dual process models (System
or Type 1: automatic, fast, intuitive, based on prior knowl-
edge; System or Type 2: effortful, slow, explicit, rule-based, e.g.,
Stanovich, 2010). A good overview on the different theories is
provided in Blanchette (2014). However, we believe that the most
reasonable explanation for the current findings is provided by
the suppression theory (Oaksford et al., 1996): processing phobia
relevant material comprised the confrontation with the phobic
object which causes fear. This yields a strong emotional response
resulting in a pre-load of working memory resources. Moreover,
there is evidence that spider phobia could change reasoning pat-
terns. De Jong et al. (1997a) showed that spider phobics tend
to rely on a danger-confirming reasoning strategy while solv-
ing phobia relevant Wason selection tasks. While spider phobics
performed worst on phobia relevant problems in our study, non-
phobics revealed worst performance on problems with negative
content. These results are in line with Blanchette and Richards
(2004) and Blanchette (2006). Overall affirmation of consequence
and denial of antecedent with spider phobia relevant and nega-
tive content resulted in more errors which is similar to findings of
Blanchette and Richards (2004).
EXPERIMENT 4: EXAM-ANXIOUS PARTICIPANTS AND
CONDITIONAL REASONING TASKS
This experiment was designed to investigate if the effect found
in Experiment 3 extends to other anxiety related conditions such
as exam-anxiety. Therefore, participants were also selected based
on their anxious state and some of the problems had an emo-
tional content which was relevant to exam-anxiety while others
were neutral or generally negative.
METHODS
Participants
The sample consisted of 17 students with exam anxiety and 17
students without exam-anxiety. They have been selected from
a larger sample (N = 47) based on their scores of a measure
for exam-anxiety (Hodapp, 1991). They were all female because
exam-anxiety is more prevalent amongst women (Zeidner and
Safir, 1989; Chapell et al., 2005; Wacker et al., 2008). The age
range was 20–29 years (mean age for participants with exam-
anxiety: 24.24 years, without exam-anxiety: 23.12 years). For
remuneration they could choose to receive five Euro or a course
credit. Psychology students and people who have already taken
part in experiments about this topic were excluded. All par-
ticipants were native German speakers and provided informed
written consent.
Design and materials
Participants were assessed with the TAI-G (Hodapp, 1991), a
measure for exam-anxiety, in order to differentiate between
exam-anxious and non-anxious participants. The TAI-G con-
sists of 30 statements which describe emotions and thoughts in
exam situations. Participants are asked how well those statements
describe them when they have to take exams. Statements were
ranked on a scale from “never” (1), “sometimes” (2), “often” (3)
to “almost always” (4).
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Examples of such statements are:
“I have a strange sensation in my stomach.”
“Thoughts suddenly start racing throughmy head that block me.”
“I worry that something could go wrong.”
Scores of the TAI-G range from 30 to 120. In order to be clas-
sified as exam-anxious a minimum score of 84 is necessary while
a score below 54 is classified as non-exam-anxious. Those limits
were obtained in a study with 730 students (Wacker et al., 2008) in
which one standard deviation (SD = 14.8) was subtracted from
the mean score (m = 69.1) to obtain the lower limit and added to
obtain the upper limit.
Once participants finished the TAI-G, they were given the con-
ditional inference problems. The 48 conditional inference prob-
lems consisted of “if, then”-statements of which one third were
exam-anxiety-related, one third generally negative and one third
emotionally neutral. Examples are given in Table 3. Presentation
of the problems and recording of answers was identical to
Experiments 2 and 3.
RESULTS
The selection of exam-phobic and non-exam phobic groups of
participants was successful. The group of the exam-anxious par-
ticipants had a TAI-G score that ranged from 84 to 107 and a
mean of 97 (SE = 1.586). The group of non-exam-anxious par-
ticipants had a score between 39 to 54 and a mean of 48 (SE =
1.047). A t-test for independent samples showed a significant
difference between groups [t(32) = 25.788, p < 0.001].
Moreover, as expected, the ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect with respect to content [F(2, 64) = 8.058; p = 0.001]. Post-
hoc t-tests showed that conditional inference problems with fear-
related content (M = 44.67%; SE = 2.52%) resulted in more
errors than other negative (M = 36.58%; SE = 2.53%) [t(33) =
3.703; p = 0.001] and neutral problems (M = 37.87%; SE =
2.80%) [t(33) = 2.626; p < 0.05]. A repeated measures ANOVA
was carried out based on error rates for type of inference (MP,
MT, AC, and DA), content (fear-related, negative, and neutral)
and exam-anxiety. However, no significant interaction was found
for content and group. This means that both exam-anxious and
non-exam-anxious participants performed similar across fear-
relevant, negative, and neutral problems.
DISCUSSION
Our results show that exam-anxious and non-exam-anxious par-
ticipants performed similar across fear-relevant, negative and
neutral problems. Inferences about exam-anxiety resulted in
Table 3 | Examples of statements with different content.
Type of content Example of statement
Exam-related If a person is waiting in front of the exam
room,
then the person is nervous
Negative If a person has breast cancer,
then the person has lumps in her breasts
Neutral If a person is thirteen years old,
then the person is still a child
reduced performance in both groups. This may be because all
participants were currently enrolled at university and so can
relate to exam-anxiety. Moreover, physiological changes have
been observed in people who are high-exam-anxious as well
as low-exam-anxious (Holroyd et al., 1978). Therefore, associa-
tions to exam-situations can get triggered which reduce working
memory resources and subsequently performance on reasoning
problems (Oaksford et al., 1996; Blanchette and Richards, 2004).
In contrast to previous findings (Lefford, 1946; De Jong et al.,
1998; Blanchette and Richards, 2004; Blanchette, 2006) negative
problems did not result in a reduction of performance. Even
though these problems were emotional and negative (e.g., “if a
person has a miscarriage, then this person will get depressed”)
participants may not have been able to relate to the content as
it was not as personally relevant to students as the exam-related
content.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We conducted two experiments with participants who underwent
a mood induction and two with participants that were either
anxious about spiders or exams. Experiment 1 showed that the
emotions of an individual have an effect on reasoning perfor-
mance independent from task content. In Experiment 2, we found
that reasoning performance can be affected either by the emo-
tion of the individual or the content of the problem or the type
of inference. In Experiment 3, spider-phobic participants showed
lower reasoning performance in spider-related inferences, but in
Experiment 4, exam-anxious participants did not perform worse
on inferences with an exam-related content.
The results agree with some of our hypotheses but not with
all of our initial assumptions. Our first hypothesis was that pos-
itive and negative emotion will result in a reduction of logical
reasoning performance. This was confirmed as in the first and
second experiment participants in a neutral emotional state out-
performed those in negative or positive emotion independent
of the task (WST and conditionals). These findings are consis-
tent with previous research (Channon and Baker, 1994; Melton,
1995; Oaksford et al., 1996). When a negative or positive emo-
tional state has been induced in participants this results in a
deterioration of performance on a Wason selection task com-
pared to participants in a neutral emotional state (Oaksford et al.,
1996). In another study participants were recruited because they
reported being depressed (Channon and Baker, 1994). They were
presented with categorical syllogisms and their performance was
worse than that of non-depressed participants. An explanation
that has been offered is that as emotionally congruent informa-
tion gets retrieved and processed this takes away resources from
working memory (e.g., Baddeley, 2003) that should have been
used to process the reasoning task. In addition, positive emo-
tional states also result in poorer performance (Melton, 1995),
as it is assumed that people in a positive mood pursuit more
global reasoning strategies, paying less attention, and are there-
fore more prone to errors than people in a negative, analytic
mood.
Our results concerning the second hypothesis (predicting a
detrimental effect on performance of positive and negative prob-
lem content) are mixed. It was confirmed by the third experiment
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in which non-phobic participants performed best when the con-
tent was neutral. On the other hand, the content had no effect
on performance in the first experiment, and in the second
experiment, best performance was measured with negative con-
tent, whereas most errors were committed with positive con-
tent. In the fourth experiment there was no difference between
negative and neutral content and performance was worst with
exam-anxiety related content. These findings partially agree with
previous research showing that performance is affected when the
content is related to general threats because then participants tend
to select threat-confirming and safety-falsification strategies in a
Wason selection task (De Jong et al., 1998). Other studies have
shown that negative as well as positive content has a detrimen-
tal effect on conditional reasoning performance as opposed to
neutral content which may be due to reduced working mem-
ory resources (Blanchette and Richards, 2004; Blanchette, 2006).
Furthermore, if the content is controversial, it can stir up emo-
tions that result in a stereotypical reaction that negatively affects
performance of a conditional reasoning task (Lefford, 1946).
In this study participants made more errors when the content
was controversial (e.g., stereotypical responses such as “homeless
person are lazy”) as opposed to neutral.
The third hypothesis stating there may be an effect on
performance when positive and negative mood is combined
with positive and negative problem content was only sup-
ported by Experiment 3, which found the expected interaction.
Nonetheless, the absence of the suggested interaction in three
of four experiments is in line with some previous findings (e.g.,
De Jong et al., 1998, health-anxiety; Vroling and de Jong, 2010,
anxiety symptoms in a non-clinical population).
Only in the third experiment participants who are afraid of
spiders performed worse on problems with a spider phobia rel-
evant content compared to a negative content which strengthens
other findings (De Jong et al., 1997a,b; Smeets et al., 2000; Vroling
and de Jong, 2009). A similar trend was observed for the perfor-
mance on spider phobia relevant problems compared to neutral
ones. Yet this difference was insignificant, maybe a bigger sam-
ple would have yielded clearer results. A previous study showed
that, when reasoning about health-threats in a Wason selection
task, health-anxiety patients have a threat-confirming strategy
(Smeets et al., 2000). Controls that do not have health-anxiety
do not show such a bias when reasoning about health-threats.
These findings are similar to another study that also used aWason
selection task where spider-phobic participants confirmed dan-
ger rules and falsified safety rules more often for phobia-relevant
information than controls (De Jong et al., 1997a). Furthermore,
socially anxious participants performed worse in relational infer-
ence tasks when the content was relevant to social anxiety as
opposed to neutral content (Vroling and de Jong, 2009). However,
spider phobic patients compared to non-phobic controls per-
formed worse when the content of the reasoning problem was
specifically related to their phobia as well as when it contained
general threat material (De Jong et al., 1997b).
Why did we find no evidence showing that performance
is improved when emotion and content are congruent? In
Blanchette et al. (2007) fearful participants provided more cor-
rect responses on a reasoning task with fear-related content than
participants that did not report a high level of fear. In another
study participants who had been primed to be angry or who
remembered an incident when they had been cheated on per-
formed better when the reasoning task involved detecting cheaters
(Chang and Wilson, 2004).
We think that the ambiguity in previous findings (Channon
and Baker, 1994; Melton, 1995; Oaksford et al., 1996; Chang
and Wilson, 2004; Blanchette et al., 2007) and our own experi-
ments may be due to the differences between samples. The first
two experiments induced emotions in participants who were
primarily sad and frustrated whereas the last two experiments’
participants were anxious. Hence one is not comparing like with
like. The latter two experiments can be further differentiated as
the third experiment selected people for the control group who
are not afraid of spiders. However, most students experience some
form of exam-anxiety and the sample of the fourth experiment
was entirely made up of students. This may explain why partici-
pants who reported exam anxiety as well as those who reported
none both performed poorly when the content was exam anxiety
related.
According to the suppression theory (Oaksford et al., 1996),
emotion has a detrimental effect on performance because
resources are otherwise allocated and not available to solve the
task at hand. This means that emotional participants should per-
form worse than those in a neutral state. This has been confirmed
in Experiments 1 and 2. Content may give rise to emotion and
so similar results due to reduced working memory resources
should also be found in experiments with emotional content. In
Experiment 3 best performance was with neutral content, possi-
bly because spider-related content triggered a response that used
resources of working memory that would otherwise have been
used to solve the task (e.g., avoidance strategy). Anxious content
in Experiment 4 resulted in worst performance possibly for the
same reason.
Thus far we focused on working memory resources, but it is
also possible that attentional processes are of major relevance in
this context. For example, correct decisions and decision times
may be compromised during emotional (especially negative)
processing, since emotional processing (in addition to reason-
ing) requires attentional resources (see for instance the work
of Harmon-Jones et al.). However, we cannot fully dissolve this
problem of working memory vs. attention at this stage with these
experiments.
The findings of Experiment 3 are in contrast to those of
Experiments 1 and 2, where no content and interaction effect
were found. People with a phobia may perform worse on prob-
lems that have a content which is related to their phobia because
they try to avoid stimuli that are anxiety-provoking (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). This avoidance is not necessar-
ily found in depressed participants as they tend to ruminate
on depressive material (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
While participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were not clinically
depressed, the emotion that was induced had a depressive quality
and therefore may explain why no interaction was found in these
experiments. In addition maybe only anxiogenic stimuli have a
depleting effect on working memory and previous research was
largely based on anxiety (De Jong et al., 1998; Blanchette and
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Richards, 2004; Blanchette, 2006). In contrast, Lefford’s (1946)
material was not anxiogenic but he found an effect. He argued
that this was due to a stereotypical response. However, if peo-
ple do not relate to the content, then this will not result in a
stereotypical response.
The reason for why no effect was found in Experiments 1 and
2 might be that the material was not as personally relevant and
therefore did not trigger sufficient emotions for an effect to show.
This does not explain why in Experiments 2 and 4 best perfor-
mance was with negative content. One could argue that since
this content is negative, participants are more deliberate in order
to avoid negative consequences (if personally relevant for them).
Furthermore, a more analytic processing style has been proposed
for depression (Edwards and Weary, 1993) so that this content
may have triggered such a processing style compared to a more
global processing strategy with a positive emotion. Considering
this one would have expected superior performance for negative
emotion in Experiments 1 and 2 which was not the case.
Therefore, more clarity might be achieved if experiments
compare personally relevant emotional content and emotional
content that is not personally relevant. Content should also
be differentiated according to it being anxious or depres-
sive. Furthermore, anxious participants should be compared to
depressed participants. A distinction has to be made between
avoidance caused by anxiety and rumination caused by depres-
sion. If a detrimental effect on performance is found in both
groups it has to be investigated whether this has the same
cause, namely depleted working memory resources (or atten-
tional resources).
From a psychotherapeutic point of view our studies are inter-
esting as they show that spider phobic patients do not only
show inadequate emotional responses to spiders. They, in fact,
also show a decrement in performing cognitive tasks, such as
logical reasoning if they have to do with spiders. The study
shows an apparent connection between reported fear on the
SPQ (Klorman et al., 1974) and behavior during experiments
(error rates). Experiments 1 and 2 show that it is neither mis-
ery nor happiness but “common unhappiness” (Freud, 1895, p.
322) that is desirable, because participants in a negative or pos-
itive mood did not perform well. This has been the case for
decades in some therapeutic approaches which have recognized
that being freed from misery better equips one to deal with life’s
adversities (Freud, 1895). People appear to find it easiest to pro-
cess neutral (non-emotional) information (Experiments 1 and 2)
but ideally sessions work with hot cognitions and elicit key emo-
tions and cognitions (Safran and Greenberg, 1982; Beck, 1995).
If neutral information becomes the focus of sessions, then ses-
sions would elicit less key emotions and cognitions and turn
into a nice chat which will be remembered pleasantly by the
patient. Thereby the patient does not get overwhelmed with emo-
tional material which will have a detrimental effect on reasoning.
Instead the emotional material can be introduced bit by bit (e.g.,
as is the case in systematic desensitization in cognitive behavioral
therapy).
It is worthwhile for patients to remember what has been
discussed in sessions because new behaviors and alternative
viewpoints which have been collaboratively developed in sessions
may be easily forgotten, especially when the patient is suffering
from a depression which often results in decreased concentration.
Some therapists recommend that their patients take notes during
sessions (Beck, 1995) but if only things that are easily remem-
bered are discussed, this problem is circumvented. Therefore, if
the patient wishes to get stabilized, non-emotional material may
be best. If they want to work through distressing material how-
ever, it will not be possible to avoid emotional content. Hence
emotions and cognitions are related and influence each other and
one has to combine them according to what the goal is.
Thus far the key finding is that emotional state and con-
tent may interact to modulate logical reasoning. This is however
only the case if (mood) state and (task) content are related
(Experiment 3; spider-related content among spider phobics).
But, this does so far not generalize to other contexts, since it
could for example not be found in a sample with exam anx-
iety (Experiment 4; exam anxiety in combination with exam
content). These ambiguities, the role of working memory and
attentional processes need to be addressed in future studies in
order to explain the influence of emotional content and emotion
on human reasoning performance.
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